Introduction
The creation, under Section 234 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 of a South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms, is a development of major world importance. It will be, once passed into law, the first Charter created under this section. Its signing, at a public ceremony at the University of Johannesburg on October 21, 2010, in Johannesburg, concluded the first phase of civil society discussions, meetings, drafting and redrafting. 1 Next it moves to the political phase for further discussions and it is hoped, eventual passage into law.
In the course of the preparation of the Charter, significant consultations with every major religious group (and many that would be considered minor) occurred and comments were assiduously considered by the Continuity Committee and the draft amended many times in response to these comments. The Continuity Committee was made up of some eight persons -one of whom is the writer of this article. The author has been involved in this process since near the beginning, and this article sets out some of the background to this work which remains, in some ways, a work in progress. Beyond the utility of the process to date (which has been most useful already in establishing links and discussion between widely diverse groups), should the Charter become a legal document, it will be the first such Charter created in South Africa and, because of the unique provision in the South African Constitution, likely the first of its kind anywhere. It will be possible, perhaps, to emulate it through laws in other countries but that is beyond the scope of this article. The Charter's significance time alone will tell, but in view of the number of groups consulted, the time spent considering the language of the text and the number of areas covered, it has no equals in South African constitutional history.
What exactly is the proposed South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms?
Before reviewing the actual document and its specific rationale, it is useful to discuss some framework issues in relation to it. In particular, it is useful to put the Charter in context by discussing what courts have said about the nature and importance of religion generally.
Religion is recognised as being important to societies and courts have recognised this
Religions are very significant to cultures and the courts, and at least in this country this has been recognised.
Consider this statement from a South African Constitutional Court decision of a decade ago in its well known decision dealing with the question of corporal punishment for children in schools. Interestingly this decision (but not the passage referred to here) which deals with religious faith and culture, was referred to in a recent Supreme Court of
Canada decision touching on religious rights. Here is what the South African court said in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education:
For many believers, their relationship with God or creation is central to all their activities. It concerns their capacity to relate in an intensely meaningful fashion to their sense of themselves, their community and their universe. For millions in all walks of life, religion provides support and nurture and a framework for individual and social stability and growth. Religious belief has the capacity to awake concepts of self-worth and human dignity which form the cornerstone of human rights. It affects the believer's view of society and founds the distinction between right and wrong. (Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC):para. 36; Currie & De Waal 2005:336-357; Farlam 2003:ch. 41; Bruker v Marcovitz 2007 3 S.C.R. 607; Boonstra & Benson 2008) Note in this passage that it is not a particular religion that is singled out here. The importance of religion 'for millions in all walks of life' is not limited to any particular religion and it will be noted that the protection of the freedom of religion in the Bill of Rights is not limited to any particular religion. In fact, the provision that protects 'religion' also protects the rights of 'belief' and of 'culture' and this, too, is not unusual. Section 9(3) of the Constitution expressly prohibits unfair discrimination on a wide list of grounds. It reads:
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
In a Canadian context, one of the sections that guarantees the right of religious freedom guarantees it equally with 'conscience' and section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part II of the Constitution Act 1982) reads 'conscience and religion'.
Nowhere can a passage be found in a Canadian Supreme Court decision, or any other with which the author is familiar, that says the sort of thing referred to above from the Christian Education decision in South Africa. Canadian judges, and those in other countries, are much less confident about the important cultural role of religion or, alternatively, do not speak in such encouraging terms about it.
What is wrong with simply leaving the development of principles to the courts on a case-by-case basis?
The limitations of litigation as a means of developing sound social policy and building civic society Litigation is not ideal for airing all the relevant issues in relation to important matters. There are various reasons for this.
Firstly, in any particular piece of litigation there is a 'hit and miss' aspect to what parties are before the court as litigants either as parties or as interveners. The latter, often having the greatest expertise in an area, also typically have a limited role in terms of taking the court record as it is found and having shorter time for argument and reduced written argument lengths et cetera.
Secondly, litigation is not the best strategy for a society to use as a method for nation building or the creation of communities of respect. The nature of the litigation means that not all aspects that should be dealt with are dealt with, often for political reasons. Thus, there was very little before the court in the same-sex marriage litigation in Canada dealing with the effects of single-sex parenting on children. The Attorney General of Canada lawyers had been instructed not to say or imply anything negative at all about 'same-sex parenting' and that political direction obviously affected what materials were before the Courts.
2 By way of comparison, when the matter was actually debated and analysed in France (at least up until 2013 when unexamined political considerations again kicked in) that country decided to reject 'same-sex marriage'. This shows that, sometimes to a considerable degree, political or ideological concerns can lead to restraints on what sorts of information will be put before the court and, as the French situation showed up until the unilateral changes in 2013, such studies (psychological, anthropological and so on) can have a determinative outcome at least for a certain period of time. Thirdly, there is the question of cost and who can afford to appear before the courts. Many of those in a position to make important arguments can simply not afford to be there. 
Why interfaith religious cooperation?
Some might ask why 'interfaith' religious cooperation should exist. Here again, the short answer is that the Constitution (in common with most countries) does not focus on 'the Christian religion' but on 'religion' and what happens to one religion in terms of an interpretation of the law will have an influence and impact on other religions. So it is necessary for those concerned about the rule of the law to recognise that all religions ought to be concerned how other religions are treated by politics and the law. In terms of formal cooperation, however, it seems to me that Canada has just naturally developed greater interfaith participation in relation to court challenges given its slightly longer constitutional history and court challenges program that existed for several years (the Canadian Constitution was re-patriated from the UK in 1982).
Canada as a matter of fact has had a history of 'interfaith' coalitions making successful attempts at intervention in some of the major court cases of the day where religious rights and freedoms are at issue.
Interfaith coalitions intervened first, with regard to the status of the unborn in a case dealing with abortion (Borowski v Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, late 1980s). Then, a few years later, in relation to statutory conjugal language in statutes dealing with 'sexual orientation' in the early to mid-1990s, (Egan and Nesbit v Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 1995 513, SCC 49, 1994 Of this passage the Supreme Court opined that:
The reference to 'Christendom' is telling. Hyde spoke to a society of shared social values where marriage and religion were thought to be inseparable. This is no longer the case. Canada is a pluralistic society. Marriage, from the perspective of the state, is a civil institution. (p. 710)
The Court held that the first question ('Is the proposed Act within the Exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada? ' [pp. 708, 717-718] ), was relevant to Section 2 of the proposed Act, which stated, 'nothing in this Act affects the freedom of officials or religious groups to refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs' (p. 716).
The Court ruled that this provision was superfluous because the question of the solemnization of marriages, Section 92 (12) of the Constitution Act 1867, gave the exclusive powers over the 'solemnization of marriages' to the provinces (as opposed to the capacity to marry -a federal issue), meaning that anything governing religious officials with regard to the performance of marriages must be governed provincially, and was ultra vires the Federal Parliament (716). The Court commented on the Act's stated purpose and its preamble as follows:
The preamble to the Proposed Act is also instructive. The Act's stated purpose is to ensure that civil marriage as a legal institution is consistent with The Court rejected the arguments made by certain religious groups stating that the recognition of same-sex marriages would discriminate against them (pp. 717-718). The Court, in explaining its position, stated:
The mere recognition of the equality rights of one group cannot, in itself, constitute a violation of the rights of another. The promotion of Charter rights and values enriches our society as a whole and the furtherance of those rights cannot undermine the very principles the Charter was meant to foster. (p. 719)
In answer to concerns that civil access to 'same-sex marriage' would create a 'collision of rights' in the culture, the Court said:
The protection of freedom of religion afforded by [ §] Iacobucci (2003:137) . The argument here is that 'reconciling' has advantages to 'balancing' as an analytical and practical tool in certain types of cases. The article reviews where reconciliation might be the best approach to what could, at first blush, appear to be a clash or conflict of rights. Of course the judgement left unanalysed an equally practical question: whether this protection for 'religious officials' would apply to the accommodation of civic officials say, Marriage Commissioners operating under state licenses that base their objections on the constitutional grounds of 'conscience and religion'. That matter is now before the courts in several Canadian provinces and as mentioned elsewhere academic opinion is divided on how they should be resolved.
9.See, for example, Smith v Knights of Columbus 2005 BCHRT 544. Here a lesbian couple sought to use a hall run by a Catholic organisation as a venue in which to hold their marriage celebration. Before the Human Rights Tribunal of British Columbia, the right of the religious group to restrict the use of its property with activities consistent with the core beliefs of the group was upheld. Despite this, however, the group was held to be liable for how it had dealt with the same-sex couple in the process of renting and then cancelling the contract. See also Boonstra and Benson (2006) (commenting on the situation regarding the scope of religious dissent to same-sex marriage as to both 'sacred places' as well as to personal objections).
suggests that seeking a modus vivendi between alternative and irreconcilable positions might be more important than vesting just one viewpoint (same-sex marriage) as a new dominant position. Accomplishing this will require greater principled nuance than has traditionally been viewed in the 'same-sex rights advancement' debates.
The Justice Committee of the Federal Government conducted hearings on the proposed Government legislation (Bill C-38) in the spring and early summer of 2004 but these were cancelled as soon as the Marriage Reference was launched That the process, fully underway would be cancelled effectively circumventing the democratic voices in preference to judicial ones was greeted with surprise and astonishment by many of the members of this Committee which had by then held many hearings and planned many more. 10 The new Civil Marriage Law that followed the Supreme Court decision and subsequent hearings before legislative committees, included amendments made as a result of suggestions by various representations, made to the House and Senate Committees. These amendments attempted to provide protection to the religious groups that dissented from the new Constitutional norm.
These amendments were passed, in part, to end the steady series of lawsuits filed against individuals, churches and groups, as well as to recognise the threats to religious groups that were evidenced in public statements. Some of these had expressly threatened religious communities or individuals on the grounds that they posed a threat to the new Constitutional (same-sex marriage inclusive) order. Certain activists went so far as to publicly state their intention to file lawsuits against religious charities if they did not begin to recognise samesex marriage, a result predicted by religious groups in their argument against same-sex marriage recognition (Robinson 2002 (Robinson -2003 Hutchinson 2005:A1) .
Once the state determines that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right, religious beliefs upholding 'traditional' marriage will come increasingly into conflict with the new constitutional norm until such time as greater principles of public sphere sharing are developed. In order for this to occur, claims by same-sex activists to public sphere dominance, like all claims to dominance by one viewpoint on legally contestable matters, need to be identified and rejected. The status of a 'tolerated discriminator' looked -to many of these groups and individuals -like pretty thin ice (to use a particularly apt metaphor in a Canadian context) and that is an ice upon which many religious groups and organisations continue to feel themselves standing. The next section will address specific examples to illustrate some of the tensions that are emerging. 2005 BCHRT 544) . The right of the religious group to restrict the use of its property with activities consistent with the core beliefs of the group was upheld. Despite this, however, the group was held to be liable for how it had dealt with the same-sex couple in the process of renting and then cancelling the contract (p. 544).
Tolerance of difference: Conflicting rights
Commenting on the situation regarding the scope of religious dissent to same-sex marriage (both as to 'sacred places' as well as to personal objections) the authors of a comment upon this decision observed:
The law in this area is a patchwork that needs clarification both on the federal and provincial level. It would be a good development if provincial legislatures, in particular, would fully analyze the impact of same-sex marriage on religious groups and legislate appropriate protection. Unless and until that happens, courts and tribunals will have to use the limited tools at their disposal to conduct this balancing. The results, like the outcome in this case, may be very confusing and insufficiently attentive to the real nature of a civil society in which people of differing beliefs have to co-exist in a real world of civilized disagreement on matters about which people may hold strong opinions and have the right to disagree. 11 (Boonstra & Benson 2006) This sort of experience in Canada shows the importance of full, frank and open discussion socially about the consequences of same-sex marital inclusion or even the extent and reasons for same-sex beneficial inclusion (as distinct from marriage) as well as sufficient time, perhaps, to rethink how to deal with the interests of all citizens.
12
Justice Albie Sachs, formerly of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, made the following thoughtful comment regarding the search for equality:
Equality should not be confused with uniformity; in fact, uniformity can be the enemy of equality. Equality means equal concern and respect across difference. It does not presuppose the elimination or suppression of difference. Respect for human rights requires the affirmation of self, not the denial of self. Equality therefore does not imply a levelling or homogenisation of behaviour but an acknowledgment and acceptance of difference. At the very least, it affirms that difference should not be the basis for exclusion, marginalisation, stigma and punishment. At best, it celebrates the vitality that difference brings to any society. 1998 12 BCLR 1517 :1574 -1575 Of course, one has to be careful in taking this approach that an unrealistic standard of human interaction is not adopted, lest 'hurt feelings' be elevated to a constitutionally-protected 11.Regarding the notion of 'society' or 'civil society' Charles Taylor reminds us that society is prior to the state (law and politics): ' … society is not constituted by the state but limits it' (Taylor 1995:287) .
(National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice
12.An extensive body of court decisions, Parliamentary speeches, and many academic articles concerning same-sex marriage, particularly from a Canadian perspective, may be found at the website of the Institute for the Study of Marriage, Law and Culture -http://www.marriageinstitute.ca. From the other side of the argument on same-sex marriage, the leading source of web-based articles and information is the site of one of Canada's most sophisticated same-sex activist organisationsEquality for Gays and Lesbians Everywhere (EGALE) -http://www.egale.ca.
category, thereby watering down to an unacceptable degree the rigour of our conceptions of equality and dignity. 13 As referred to above many religious bodies and interfaith groups have intervened in important cases touching on religious liberty over the past decade and a half in Canada.
They have seen first-hand in situations such as the eradication of denominational education rights in Newfoundland and Quebec (Constitution Act 1867 § 93A), that, in their view religious communities and individual believers are often not being accorded the respect they deserve and to which they are entitled (MacDougall 2006:353-354 ). 14 In Canada, many religious believers and groups speak openly about feeling excluded and threatened by developments they see around them (Lafferty 2007:307-312) . The breadth and depth of this concern is not something that any citizen should take lightly given the important role that religious beliefs play in society.
In South Africa, many religious believers were also concerned where changes to the legal understanding of marriage would take their own communities. Thus, in Fourie, religious groups sought and obtained, status as amicus curiae based on an affidavit by Cardinal Wilfred Napier, of the Roman Catholic Church.
In Christian Education, as we saw above, the majority of the Court was quite willing to comment on the importance of religious beliefs to South African society; we see the same openness in other more recent decisions of the same Court In Fourie, the majority of the Court found religious beliefs and their associations to be socially important in these terms:
Religious bodies play a large and important part in public life, through schools, hospitals and poverty relief programmes. They command ethical behaviour from their members and bear witness to the exercise of power by state and private agencies; they promote music, art and theatre; they provide halls for community activities, and conduct a great variety of social activities for their members and the general public. They are part of the fabric of public life, and constitute active elements of the diverse and pluralistic nation contemplated by the Constitution. Religion is not just a question of belief or doctrine. It is part of a people's temper and culture, and for many believers a significant part of their way of life. Religious organisations constitute important sectors of national life and accordingly have a right to express themselves to government and the courts on the great issues of the day. They are active participants in public affairs fully entitled to have their say with regard to the way law is made and applied. 14.In favour of accommodating the right of officials not to perform same-sex marriages on the basis that tolerance allows for disagreement, see Lafferty (2007:307-312 ).
Important to note here is the fact that the Court finds religion not simply to be an 'individual' matter but something important for the community and the whole society. 15 The Court continued, however, with this observation setting out a limitation on the public use of religious argumentation:
It is one thing for the Court to acknowledge the important role that religion plays in our public life. It is quite another to use religious doctrine as a source for interpreting the Constitution. It would be out of order to employ the religious sentiments of some as a guide to the constitutional rights of others … Whether or not the Biblical texts support his beliefs would certainly not be a question which this Court could entertain. From a constitutional point of view, what matters is for the Court to ensure that he be protected in his right to regard his marriage as sacramental, to belong to a religious community that celebrates its marriages according to its own doctrinal tenets, and to be free to express his views in an appropriate manner both in public and in Court. What the court wishes to see is coexistence within difference. If the experience in Canada is anything to go on, however, it is reasonable to suggest that such coexistence is going to require a considerable amount of litigation in order for the genuinely 'open' nature of the public sphere to be ensured. In the process of such litigation, a Charter of the sort that has now been signed in South Africa could be of considerable guidance to the courts and legislatures in terms of the key principles to be applied, though whether a genuinely open form of pluralism can be realised and maintained remains an open question.
Litigation in Canada over the past years has shown that for matters such as public school curricula, letters to the press, employment contracts and the nature of religious organisations themselves, it could be said that eternal litigation, rather than vigilance, is the price to be paid for liberty. This brings me to more particular questions about the creation of the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms.
Why a charter in addition to the enumerated rights? Two forms of civil society response to legislatures and courts -South African and Canadian
The role that religions could play in relation to the ongoing formation of the South African constitution was understood early on by Justice Albie Sachs (1990) when he wrote:
Ideally in South Africa, all religious organizations and persons concerned with the study of religion would get together and draft a charter of religious rights and responsibilities. … it would be up to the participants themselves to define what they consider to be their fundamental rights. (pp. 46-47) 15 .I have written about the tension between the right of religion and belief to be viewed 'individualistically' rather than in its (preferred) dimension -associationally; both aspects should be kept in view. See Benson (2008:297, 297-312) . The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, was based in part on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Canadian Charter contains no provision similar to Section 234 of the South African Constitution. The Canadian Charter provided a method of democratic response to judicial decisions by way of an override provision (Section 33) which allows laws to be continued in force for a limited time despite a judicial declaration of constitutional invalidity. 16 Such a declaration is time-limited making it, so the theory goes, an election issue upon which a Government using such a declaration could fall. Given the political realities of South Africa, with the dominance of one party, such a provision would not work in principle or in practice as it could effectively suspend the Constitution without the likelihood of the ballot box providing accountability.
Section 234, on the other hand, gives South Africans a means to offer guidance to both politics and the courts though, since it has not been used until now, it is not certain what the political process will do to the work with which civil society (in terms of the major religions) has already been involved.
In principle, however, Section 234 gives those who come up with such charters, emerging from civil society, the chance to specify in greater detail what they think matters and the location of Section 234 in the Constitution suggests that legislation passed under this provision will be accorded a kind of 'super statutory' or constitutional status by virtue of that inclusion.
So what has happened in South Africa to date in terms of the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms?
History of the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms
The first formal substantive step towards the formation of the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms was when a group of legal and theological academics called a meeting in Stellenbosch in October 2007 at which a variety of groups (primarily Christian at the beginning though this changed over time) met to discuss the background to such a document and whether it would be advisable to develop such a document. The author spoke about the Canadian experience of 'interfaith cooperation' and how such cooperation is essential in constitutional democracies formed around notions of pluralism and multiculturalism. 17 One conclusion of that meeting was that representation had to be extended further afield to invite all the major religions (including African customary religions) to attend to comment upon a basic draft that was to be prepared prior to that meeting and that particular care should be taken to invite all religions to the table.
The draft was prepared by a small working group and a further meeting called for February 14, 2008. Prior to that meeting an invitation was sent out to every major religion in South Africa inviting participation and stressing that the draft was completely open for discussion and was not in any way 'set in stone'.
The rationale document attached to the invitation which went out over the signature of theologian Dr Pieter Coertzen from Stellenbosch (but largely drafted by law Professor Rassie Malherbe from the University of Johannesburg) stated as follows:
Motivation for a Charter of Religious Rights for South Africa:
Section 234 of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996, provides that 'in order to deepen the culture of democracy established by the Constitution, Parliament may adopt Charters of Rights consistent with the provisions of the Constitution', which charters will then, have the force of law. The Constitution envisages, in other words, that the rights in the Constitution may be further extended, supplemented and given content by way of such charters.
2. The room which Section 234 creates for a charter of religious rights provides religious institutions with a golden opportunity to take the initiative in a matter that is crucially important to every religious person and institution. In an open, free and democratic society it cannot be left to the state alone to determine the content of our rights. Structures such as religious institutions should make a contribution in areas in which they have a direct interest and of which they have intimate knowledge. If religious institutions succeed in submitting to the state a consensus proposal regarding a charter of religious rights, the state will hardly be able to ignore it. Thus, religious institutions will be able to leave their own significant imprint on the content of the right to freedom of religion and on the evergreen question regarding the relationship between religion and the state.
3. The Constitution creates this room for additional charters of rights because most rights guaranteed in the Constitution are described in cryptic, vague and general terms. The intention is that society, and specifically the state by way of legislation and other measures, and the courts through their judgments, must over time give further content to these rights. For example, the right to freedom of religion is protected in so many words in Section 15 of the Constitution, but Section 15 provides nothing else about the content of the right.
4. In the case of several rights in the Constitution the state has already adopted separate acts of Parliament to further describe the content and application of the rights concerned.
The following examples may be mentioned: Directly or indirectly, numerous other acts give effect to the rights in the Constitution as well, as in the case of health, housing, education, the environment, the rights of children, the right to vote, and the rights of accused persons and prisoners. In addition, Section 234 creates yet another opportunity for such supplementary legislation.
5. There are a few reasons why a charter of religious rights may serve a useful purpose.
5.1. The right to freedom of religion as guaranteed in the Constitution is an important instrument regulating the relationship between religion and the state. As the supreme law of the Republic, the Constitution restricts in effect the powers of the state, because the state may not violate the rights in the Constitution without fulfilling the requirements of the Constitution. A charter of religious rights which further describes the content of the right, will outline even more clearly the relationship between religion and the state, and will secure the good relationship already existing between religion and the state. This relationship in terms of which freedom of religion and the autonomy of religious institutions are recognised, and religious institutions are accommodated positively and impartially in the state, should be stipulated unequivocally in a charter of religious rights. 5.2. By leaving the right to religious freedom undefined in the Constitution, one actually accepts that the content of the right will be determined through court decisions and other measures on an ad hoc basis, in other words, as issues and difficulties occur. This is a process over which religious institutions have little control. Section 234, on the contrary, creates the possibility to propose a charter of religious rights in which the content of the right is spelled out fully in a single charter. 5.3. Throughout history conflict between religion and the state occurred from time to time in most countries and there were even periods of large scale religious persecution. In our country, as well, issues sometimes occur over which religious institutions differ from the state or where the state take [sic] steps that limit or may limit religious freedom. By defining and stipulating clearly in an act this relationship, and what is allowed and what not, unnecessary state interference with religion which may occur in future can be prevented, and uncertainty, misunderstanding and unnecessary conflict between religion and the state can be eliminated. 5.4. A charter of religious rights can contribute to the spirit of tolerance prevailing between the various religions in South Africa. Compared to many other countries, South Africa is particularly blessed in this respect, and insofar as a charter of religious rights can enhance this spirit, South Africans should do their utmost to maintain and strengthen the good relationship among the different religions.
6. There are interesting international examples to which one may refer in this regard. We think this is a very important matter for the whole of South Africa and that we as religious communities have a big responsibility to make a contribution to freedom of religion in our country through a Charter of Religious Rights. We look forward to see you at the workshop. What occurred, and in spectacular fashion, was that the major religions present -Hindu, Christian (including Catholic, Orthodox, Zion Christian Church and Reformed branches), Jewish, Muslim and others gave one hundred percent support not only to the need for a document but to the process being used and the terms of the document itself.
A continuity committee was set up following the February 14, 2008 
Conclusion of meetings
The groups consulted (which eventually extended considerably beyond the above list) continued to express support and interest in the Charter. Many substantive comments were received, some of these from individuals and others from academics in many countries internationally. These consultations continued and at the time of the public signing of the draft in October 2010, version 6.0 represented the insights and contributions of hundreds of interventions, contributions and suggestions being made from throughout South Africa and internationally.
The process has allowed for very broad and deep consultation across a wide spectrum of religions in South Africa and some of the key groups involved in religion and human rights.
The public signing ceremony and future anticipated steps
The public signing of the document on October 21, 2010 at the main board room of the University of Johannesburg was followed by a meeting of the signatories that established a Council for Religious Rights and Freedoms pursuant to section 185 (1) (c) of the Constitution and other relevant provisions of the Promotion and Protection of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities Act 19 of 2002. At the time of this writing a steering committee has been established of members and experts that will continue to raise support for the Charter and draft a Constitution for the Council to move ahead in discussions with the government. Those who have invested so much time and work in the process are hopeful that it will be passed into law for the guidance of South African society in future cases.
The document in its most recent version is attached as an Appendix to this article.
Conclusion The significance of the proposed Charter for South Africa and other countries
What has occurred has been deep, meaningful and, might well be in the long run of great importance not only within South Africa but in many other countries as well. 18 The process, document and meetings have shown both that religions can cooperate at a high level of sophisticated and mature discussion and that principles important to each religion can be shared and recognised as important to all religions. These principles are a substantive contribution to the principles of modus vivendi as they include not only the right to join a religion but also to leave one. Finally, the process, which is ongoing, shows that there are alternatives to political and legal avoidance of key aspects when the civil society organisations themselves show leadership in important areas in the context of a constitutional document set up so as to encourage the involvement of civil society in its ongoing development. The process also provides a means of more holistic principled development than the ad hoc nature of litigation on a case-by-case basis.
In this respect, use of Section 234 of the South African Constitution provides an important landmark for those who are concerned that constitutional development has become the property of a small number of judges and activist litigation strategists.
It remains to be seen how the political process will respect the hard work that has been done by civil society. A sign of respect would be to recognise that the Charter represents an extraordinary cooperation between as wide a set of interest groups as could likely be assembled. It did not include every possible group -that goal would be impossible of realisation. It is for the Government, in conversation with the Council for Religious Rights and Freedoms that has been established, to determine whether Section 234 of the Constitution will prove to be useful and usable in South Africa.
18.The author has met with officials at the Ministerial level provincially and federally in Canada to discuss whether, in principle, enactments could be developed that might serve in a manner akin to 'Interpretation Acts' in such a way that civil society initiatives could be both encouraged and effective in crafting greater delineation of the meaning of the general rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Should this occur it will be in no small part due to the South African experience in relation to that country's Section 234. In addition, discussions of the Charter and its processes have occurred in the United Kingdom, Italy and the United States and with delegates from some thirty-five other countries. In addition to the six African, English and Afrikaans versions of the Charter, it is available in German and plans are afoot to have it translated into Khoi/San, Italian, Spanish, French and Arabic. At the signing ceremony on October 21, 2010 portions of a letter in support of the process and its cultural importance from the Hon. Noel Kinsella, Speaker of the Senate of Canada was read by the author who gave a short presentation on the international significance of the South African Charter.
5. WHEREAS it is recognized that rights impose the corresponding duty on everybody in society to respect the rights of others; and 6. WHEREAS the state through its governing institutions has the responsibility to govern justly, constructively and impartially in the interest of everybody in society; and 7. WHEREAS religious belief may deepen our understanding of justice, love, compassion, culture, democracy, human dignity, equality, freedom, rights and obligations, as well as our understanding of the importance of community and relationship in our lives and in society, and may therefore be beneficial for the common good; and 8. WHEREAS the recognition and effective protection of the rights of religious communities and institutions will contribute to a spirit of mutual respect and tolerance among the people of South Africa; and
Therefore the following Charter of Religious Rights and
Freedoms is hereby adopted as follows: has the right to maintain traditions and systems of religious personal, matrimonial and family law that are consistent with the Constitution and are recognised by law. 6. Every person has the right to freedom of expression in respect of religion. 6.1. Every person has the right to (a) make public statements and participate in public debate on religious grounds, (b) produce, publish and disseminate religious publications and other religious material, and (c) conduct scholarly research and related activities in accordance with their religious or other convictions. 6.2. Every person has the right to share their religious convictions with others on a voluntary basis. 6.3. Every religious institution has the right to have access to public media and public broadcasting in respect of religious matters and such access must be regulated fairly. 6.4. Every person has the right to religious dignity, which includes not to be victimised or slandered on the ground of their faith, religion, convictions or religious actions. The advocacy of hatred that is based on religion, and that constitutes incitement to imminent violence or to cause physical harm, is not allowed. 7. Every person has the right to be educated or to educate their children, or have them educated, in accordance with their religious or philosophical convictions. 7.1. The state, which includes any public school, has the duty to respect this right and to inform and consult with parents on these matters. Parents may withdraw their children from school activities or programs inconsistent with their religious or philosophical convictions. 7.2. Every educational institution may adopt a particular religious or other ethos, as long as it is observed in an equitable, free, voluntary and non-discriminatory way, and with due regard to the rights of minorities. The preference for a particular religious ethos does not constitute discrimination in breach of the constitution with respect to religious education. 7.3. Every private educational institution established on the basis of a particular religion, philosophy or faith may impart its religious or other convictions to all children enrolled in that institution, and may refuse to promote, teach or practice any religious or other conviction other than its own. Children (or their parents) who do not subscribe to the religious or other convictions practised in that institution waive their right to insist not to participate in the religious activities of the institution. 8. Every person has the right on a voluntary basis to receive and provide religious education, training and instruction. The state may subsidise such education, training and instruction. 9. Every religious institution has the right to institutional freedom of religion. 9.1. Every religious institution has the jurisdictional independence to (a) determine its own confessions, doctrines and ordinances, (b) decide for itself in all matters regarding its doctrines and ordinances, and (c) in compliance with the principles of tolerance, fairness and accountability regulate its own internal affairs, including organisational structures and procedures, the ordination, conditions of service, discipline and dismissal of office-bearers and members, the appointment, conditions of employment and dismissal of employees and volunteers, and membership requirements. 9.2. Every religious institution is recognised and protected as an institution that functions with jurisdictional independence, and towards which the state, through its governing institutions, has the responsibility to govern justly, constructively and impartially in the interest of everybody in society. 9.3. The state, including the judiciary, must respect the jurisdictional independence of every religious institution, and may not regulate or prescribe matters of doctrine and ordinances. 9.4. The confidentiality of the internal affairs and communications of a religious institution must be respected. Specifically, the privileged nature of any religious communication that has been made with an expectation of confidentiality must be respected in legal proceedings. 9.5. Every religious institution is subject to the law of the land, and must justify any disagreement, or civil dissent, on the basis of its religious convictions or doctrines.
10. Every religious institution that qualifies as a juristic person has the right to participate in legal matters, for example by concluding contracts, acquiring, maintaining and disposal of property, and access to the courts. The state may allow religious institutions tax, charitable and other benefits. 11. Every person has the right, for religious purposes and in furthering their objectives, to solicit, receive, manage, allocate and spend voluntary financial and other forms of support and contributions. The confidentiality of such support and contributions must be respected.
12. Every person has the right on religious or other grounds, and in accordance with their ethos, and irrespective of whether they receive state-aid, and of whether they serve persons with different convictions, to conduct relief, upliftment, social justice, developmental, charity and welfare work in the community, establish, maintain and contribute to charity and welfare associations, and solicit, manage, distribute and spend funds for this purpose. 
